What empirical work can tell us about primary metaphors by Valenzuela Manzanares, Javier
WHAT EmPIRICAL WORK CAN TELL US 
AbOUT PRImARY mETAPHORS*
Javier Valenzuela
Universidad de murcia
Quaderns de Filologia. Estudis lingüístics. Vol. XIV (2009) 235-249
1. intrOductiOn 
One of the (many) riddles about language and its relation to thought is how 
is it possible that we can talk about things that we do not perceive directly. How 
are we able to communicate our thoughts about intangible, abstract notions 
such as love, friendship, importance, peace, justice or inflation? One of the 
possible explanations has been provided by what has been termed “Conceptual 
metaphor Theory” (henceforth, CmT1), championed by George Lakoff and 
mark Johnson. In their 1999 book, they propose that our ability to entertain 
abstract thoughts depends crucially on our ability to project information from 
concrete domains, from which we do have direct and grounded experiences 
(basically, sensorimotor information), onto abstract domains. Such abstract 
domains can in this way be re-structured and understood more easily. most of 
the evidence for the existence of this cognitive mechanism comes from linguistic 
grounds. Thus, and just to name a couple of examples, metaphors have proved 
extremely useful to explain issues such as the extension of meanings (i.e., 
polysemy) in our lexicon (Lakoff, 1987). Instead of a haphazard collection 
of senses, the lexicon can in this way be regarded as a motivated network 
in which many of the extensions from one sense to another are based on a 
metaphoric (or metonymic) link. metaphor and metonymy have also suggested 
very natural pathways for the diachronic evolution of the meaning of words 
(Sweetser, 1990) and even of grammatical constructions. 
* This work has been partially supported by the research projects SEJ2006-04732/PSIC and 05817/
PHCS/07 (Fundación Séneca)
1 We will use this denomination for the theory for lack of an “official” name; some authors working 
within the theory have been using a slightly different version which also includes “metonymy” (i.e., 
“The Cognitive Theory of metaphor and metonymy” –CTmm; cf. barcelona, 2002). 
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However, since in a very explicit way, a metaphor in CmT is not conceived 
as a linguistic phenomenon, but rather as a cognitive mechanism that helps us 
structure our inventory of concepts, there must necessarily be other ways of 
proving their existence. Some alternative methods could include for example, 
psycholinguistic studies or just any of the other methodologies that the broader 
field of cognitive science normally uses to assess its proposed explanatory 
notions. 
There is more or less general agreement on the fact that nonlinguistic 
evidence is needed to buttress the notion of metaphor as a fundamental mental 
capacity by which we conceptualize abstract experiences. This has in fact been 
argued by many authors, many of them working within CmT, as a necessary 
step to avoid some of the accusations of “circularity of reasoning”. A common 
methodology in metaphor theory has been to group together a given number of 
linguistic expressions, which are found to share certain common characteristics, 
and then use these expressions to propose a given conceptual metaphor; this 
conceptual metaphor is in turn used to explain why there is such a numerous 
group of these linguistic expressions2. 
Lakoff & Johnson (1999) presented psycholinguistic evidence supporting 
their theory, but the debate whether psycholinguistic studies support or reject 
CmT is far from over. Some psychologists have openly contested the theory 
and seem reluctant to accept some of its tenets (e.g., Glucksberg, brown 
& mcGlone, 1993; Glucksberg & mcGlone, 1999; Keysar & bly, 1999; 
mcGlone, 1996, 2007; murphy, 1996, 1997), while, on the other hand, many 
recent studies provide evidence which seems to be consistent with CmT 
(e.g., boroditsky, 2000, 2001; boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Casasanto & 
boroditsky, 2008; Françozo, Lima & Gibbs, 2004; meier & Robinson, 2004; 
Santiago, Lupiáñez, Pérez & Funes, 2007; Schubert, 2005; Silvera, Josephs & 
Giesler, 2004; Torralbo, Santiago & Lupiáñez, 2006). 
One more or less recent notion in CmT that can be useful for settling these 
matters is that of Primary Metaphor. Since its proposal in Grady (1997), the 
distinction between Complex and Primary Metaphors has figured prominently 
in all introductions to CmT. For example, in Lakoff & Johnson (1999), this 
distinction superseded other previous distinctions between different types 
of metaphors (e.g., ontological vs imagistic vs structural, etc), that had been 
present in older versions of the theory (e.g., Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 
1993; Lakoff & Turner 1989). 
2 For a review of this and some other “putative” problems with CmT, see Valenzuela & Soriano 
(2004).
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In what follows (section 2), we will present the main characteristics of 
Primary Metaphor Theory, which apart for other benefits, “opens possibilities 
for falsifying the theory” (Costa, 2004:110). After that, in Section 3, we will 
review some empirical work which partly supports and partly refines the 
theory. One aim of this paper is to show how empirical work can help not just 
to support or reject theoretical proposals, but even to refine hypotheses, to 
make them more specific and focused and to point at newer phenomena that 
must be theoretically integrated.
2. PriMary MetaPhOr theOry
Primary metaphors were initially presented by Joseph Grady (Grady, 1997) 
and later on included in the “official” version of CMT (e.g, Lakoff & Johnson, 
1999; Feldman, 2004). Grady’s initial observation was that some conceptual 
metaphors could be decomposable into simpler ones; after examining carefully 
a metaphor such as theOries are Buildings, he came to propose that it was 
actually formed by two more basic metaphors, Persisting is standing erect 
and OrganizatiOn is Physical structure. this decomposition could in fact 
be extended to the rest of the metaphorical system, in such a way that some 
metaphors emerged as “atoms” or “primitives”. These “atomic” metaphors 
could then be combined to form more complex ones3. 
Primary metaphors have several characteristics that make them special: 
they arise from experiential correlations, so their learning is unconscious and 
automatic, they are therefore better candidates for universals and also highly 
embodied, and the experiences that both source and target domains make 
reference to are relatively basic. Let us see each of these characteristics with a 
little bit more of detail. 
Probably the most salient characteristic of these metaphors concerns their 
origin: they arise from experiential correlations in the world. This represents 
a change in previous versions of the theory, since now, the origin of metaphor 
is not some type of perceived similarity but the notion of co-ocurrence. For 
example, in many ocassions we perceive a scene in which there is an increment 
in quantity of some substance or material and we are able to perceive that 
the stuff that is increasing in quantity also increases in height. This is what 
happens if we pile books on a table: the more books we put, the higher the pile 
goes; the same correlation would be observed when we fill a bottle with water, 
or in countless other cases. This perceived correlation between quantity and 
3 The precise ways in which the “molecular” complex metaphors are formed fall outside the direct 
scope of Primary metaphor theory and are better explained by Fauconnier and Turner’s Theory of 
Conceptual blending and Integration.
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verticality is what would give rise to the primary metaphor MOre is uP, which 
would then explain more abstract uses of “increase in quantity”, such as the 
stock prices all over the world have gone down/plummeted in this crisis or a 
high level of cholesterol could lead to heart problems.
The linguist Christopher Johnson (Johnson, 1999) went even further and 
suggested that there is a period in the development of the child’s conceptual 
system in which s/he does not distinguish between both domains: they are said 
to be conflated. In this theory of conflation, we encounter complex situations 
which are experienced globally, as experiential gestalts4, but in which different 
facets can potentially be distinguished. Thus, for a baby being affectionately 
held, the same situation encompasses the expression of affectiOn and the warMth 
of being held; these two notions are thus “conflated” in his/her experience. It is 
only later at a more advanced stage in his/her cognitive development that s/he 
learns to discriminate more finely and both notions are seggregated; however, 
this connection between both domains persists in some form and is the basis of 
the mappings that give rise to the primary metaphor affectiOn is warMth. 
Primary metaphors are highly embodied, in at least two different senses. 
On the one hand, they depend directly on our interaction with the environment 
and thus our bodily characteristics: we experience notions such as warmth or 
height directly with our bodies, via our perceptual/sensorimotor apparatus. 
Their embodied nature makes them compatible with embodied approaches to 
language and cognition (e.g., barsalou, 1999, 2003; Glenberg, 1997; Gibbs, 
2003; Zwaan, 2004). The second sense in which they are embodied is a 
derivation from Conflation theory: in those initial experiences, the two domains 
that are correlated are activated simultaneously in our brain; they become in 
this way linked by neural connections by means of the mechanism known as 
Hebbian learning (which could be paraphrased as “neurons that fire together, 
wire together”). Thus, in Lakoff & Johnson (1999) we are told that metaphors 
have a direct, physical existence in our brains: they are the neural connections 
that link distinct brain areas belonging to the correlated domains. 
Obviously, we acquire primary metaphors in an automatic and unconscious 
fashion, simply by interacting with the world. Since many of the experiential 
correlations that provide the basis for primary metaphors are found in common 
human scenes, and since all humans share similar bodily experiences, these 
metaphors may well be universal. So to speak, universal primary experiences 
would tend to produce universal primary metaphors. This is different from 
complex metaphors, where the combination of primary metaphors into some 
4 What Vilarroya (2002) would call a slife, his short-hand term for “slice of life”.
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specific configuration holds a higher chance of being affected by culture-
specific factors. 
There are additional characteristics of primary metaphors; for example, 
both source and target domains correspond to relatively simple domains. 
Roughly, source domains are embodied experiences, typically related to 
perceptual or force-dynamic schematizations of experience, while target 
domains are normally subjective fields of evaluation, for example, something 
being difficult or not, important or not, good or not, perceiving an entity as 
being the controlling or the controlled one in a given situation, etc. 
Table 1. Some Primary metaphors
Given this state of affairs, it should be clear now why psycholinguistic and 
neurolinguistic evidence for these metaphors should be easier to locate than 
for more cultural, complex metaphors. In this paper, we review a number of 
empirical studies that have been (and are still being) conducted that address the 
putative existence of these structures in the human mind. Our specific aim is to 
show how, in true cognitive science spirit, looking at these cognitive-linguistic 
notions from the point of view of research conducted in neighbouring areas 
(e.g., social psychology or cognitive psychology), can help us arrive at a more 
precise and defined view of these structures. Due to space limitations, we will 
make a selection of relevant work5, trying to show the benefits of an interaction 
between empirical work and theoretical models. 
5 A more inclusive review (which also presents a detailed psychological model of metaphor 
processing) can be found in Santiago, Román & Ouellet (in prep).
- Affection Is Warmth
- Important Is big
- Happy Is Up
- Intimacy Is Closeness
- bad Is Stinky
- Difficulties Are Burdens
- more Is Up
- Categories Are -
  Containers
- Similarity Is Closeness
- Linear Scales Are Paths
- Organization Is Physical 
 Structure
- Help Is Support
- Time Is motion
- States Are Locations
- Change Is motion
- Purposes Are 
 Destinations
- Purposes Are Desired 
 Objects
- Causes Are Physical   
 Forces
- Relationships Are 
 Enclosures
- Control Is Up
- Knowing Is Seeing
- Understanding Is 
 Grasping
- Seeing Is Touching
- Desire is Hunger
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3. sOMe eMPirical wOrK dealing with PriMary MetaPhOrs
3.1. Time as space
The use of the physical domain of space to structure the more abstract 
domain of time is with all probability the better known and more widely 
investigated of all metaphors; to use Casasanto’s metaphor, tiMe has become 
our particular “Fruit fly”: 
“Time has become for the metaphor theorist what the fruit fly is for the 
geneticist: the model system of choice for linguistic and psychological tests 
of relationships between metaphorical source and target domains” (Casasanto, 
in press).
There is a wealth of studies uncovering the relationships existing between 
space and time6. In general, most of these studies can be taken as sound 
empirical support for the general idea that the domain of tiMe is structured by 
sPace (e.g., boroditsky, 2000, 2001; boroditsky & Ramscar, 2002; Casasanto 
& boroditsky, 2008; Nuñez, motz & Teuscher, 2005; Santiago, Lupiáñez, 
Pérez & Funes, 2007; Torralbo, Santiago & Lupiáñez, 2006). The more specific 
proposals made by CmT regarding the spatial structuring of time, that is, the 
proposal that there are (at least) two types of spatial metaphors that structure 
time, namely, the Ego-moving metaphor (e.g. we are approaching Christmas) 
and the Time-moving metaphor (e.g., Christmas holidays are getting nearer) 
have also been specifically supported (e.g., Boroditsky, 2000, 2001; Gentner, 
Imai & boroditsky, 2002). Some of these studies have additionally addressed 
the relationship between embodied experience and the metaphoric system; 
for example, boroditsky & Ramscar (2002) showed how some our real-world 
experience of spatial situations (e.g., standing in a cafeteria line or riding on a 
train) had an effect on the type of spatiotemporal metaphors that are activated. 
In this way, people experiencing motion (e.g., on a train) were more likely 
to use an Ego-moving metaphor for time, while those that underwent the 
experience of an object moving towards them (e.g., waiting for a train), were 
more likely to activate the Time-moving version. 
Empirical work in this area has gone beyond the initial proposals of CmT. 
Initially, in both the “Ego-moving metaphor” and the “Time-moving metaphor” 
versions, time was conceived as a horizontal line in a front-back axis to the 
speaker, in such a way that the Future was conceived in front and the past was 
6 In fact, the relationships between space and time have been known for a long time; see for example 
Piaget & Inhelder (1969)
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conceived behind the speaker. Núñez & Sweetser (2006) gesture studies were 
able to show that, in some cultures, this organization could be reversed: for the 
Aymara, the future is at the back and the past is in front of the person. As it turns 
out, the time-line can have other axes in fact; for example, boroditsky (2001) 
was able to show that mandarin speakers could also conceptualize the time line 
vertically, so that the past is located “up” and the future is “down” (so that the 
“down” month would approximately mean the “next” month). Additionally, in 
this study she showed that English speakers could be trained to organize time 
also vertically, suggesting more concrete ways in which cognitive structuring 
can take place. 
Finally, empirical research has also uncovered another way of spatializing 
time, which, interestingly enough, has no linguistic reflex (at least no language 
that uses it has been reported yet). In these cases, time is conceived as a 
horizontal line which progresses, not on a sagittal view (i.e., front-back), but on 
a transversal one (i.e., left-right). Priming experiments by Torralbo, Santiago 
& Lupiáñez (2006) and Santiago, Lupiáñez, Perez & Funes (2007) and gesture 
studies by Casasanto and Lozano (2008) have shown how in Western societies, 
this horizontal line is followed left-to-right, so that the past is located to our left, 
and the future is located to our right. This seems to be related to the direction 
of writing-reading, and there is evidence that the opposite orientation is found 
in cultures that have the opposite way of writing (e.g., Tversky, Kugelmass & 
Winter, 1991). Thus, for Hebrews and Arabs, the past is located on the right and 
the future on the left (the same explanation could be applied to boroditsky’s 
results with mandarin speakers). 
3.2. Other spatial metaphors
Happy is up/good is up. Time is not the only domain which has been shown 
to be spatially organized. For example, Casasanto & Lozano (2008) used a 
variant of the Stroop effect paradigm which involved gesturing to show that 
vertical organization underlies the use of abstract domains such as haPPiness. 
in their study, participants had to use both hands to move marbles from one 
tray to another one located either above (red) or below (blue). The direction 
of the movement was made to depend on the colour of a word appearing in 
a screen. So, for example, if the word appearing in the screen was blue, they 
had to move a ball to the blue tray below, and if it was red, they had to move 
it up to the red tray7. Crucially, the meaning of the word (though irrelevant for 
the task, which involved only the colour of the letters) was related to “happy” 
7 Actually, the location of the blue and red trays was counterbalanced across subjects.
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or to “sad”. Participants were much quicker (and accurate) moving the balls 
when the resulting gesture was metaphor-congruent (that is, when a “happy” 
word corresponded to an “up” gesture) than in metaphor-incongruent cases. 
The same results were obtained when the words were replaced by happy or sad 
faces (this time, the red or blue colour guiding the motion was present in the 
image-background in which the faces appeared). Some of the stimulus they 
used also corresponded to other words hypothetically organized by vertical 
metaphors (e.g., wealthy, poor, virtuous, evil, hero, villain, etc.). 
meier & Robinson (2004) also tested the relationship between what they 
termed “affect” (a term they used to include notions such as “happy/sad” and 
also “good/bad”) and “vertical position”. In their experiment, subjects were 
quicker to respond to “affective” words (e.g, hero or good) appearing at the top 
of the screen than in metaphor-incongruent positions (i.e., at the bottom). 
Control/power is up. Schubert (2005) and Valenzuela & Soriano (in 
press) have conducted studies dealing with the cOntrOl is uP metaphor. For 
example, Valenzuela & Soriano (in press) presented subjects with vertically 
arranged pairs of words. The task of the subjects was to decide whether both 
items were semantically related or not. The presentation of the stimuli could 
be either metaphor-congruent (e.g., captain above soldier) or the other way 
round. Subjects were quicker to respond in metaphor-congruent positions than 
in metaphor-incongruent cases. 
A specially interesting case is Schubert (2005); in one of his experiments, 
he was able to dissociate the dimensions of “power” and “judgment” (normally, 
“power” is associated with “good”). For example, besides stimuli in which 
powerful and positive are associated (e.g., leader), he also included cases in 
which there was an association between powerful and negative (e.g. dictator). 
Interestingly, people responded to these words differently when the task 
required them to judge them either as positive or as powerful. Thus, dictator 
was processed quicker if it appeared at the top of the screen when the task 
involved judging stimuli as powerful or not, and was processed quicker if it 
appeared at the bottom of the screen when the task involved judging stimuli 
as positive or not, showing in this way how flexibility of mapping plays a 
prominent role in the processing of abstract words, a mechanism that has not 
been outlined by CmT.
similarity is Closeness. Casasanto (in press) tested the relationship 
between similarity and closeness, which is said to motivate the sense extensions 
of words such as close or far that can be used with the meanings “similar” and 
“different”, respectively (e.g., that is not the correct answer, but it is close 
enough, or their opinions on this issue couldn’t be farther apart). In his initial 
experiment, Casasanto presented pairs of abstract words (e.g., grief and justice) 
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and asked his subjects to rate how similar/different they were. both words 
appeared horizontally alligned, side by side, but in three different positions; 
close to each other, separated from each other, or far from each other. His 
results showed that people would judge the same word-pair as more similar 
when they had seen it close to each other, and as more different when it had been 
presented in the more distant condition. However, these results were reversed 
in a second experiment in which the stimuli involved pictures of unfamiliar 
faces. This time, when the pairs of faces were presented far from each other, 
they were judged as more similar than when they were presented close to each 
other. He included a final experiment in which concrete words were presented 
and subjects were asked to evaluate their similarity either in appearance or in 
function/use. The results showed that subjects who were asked to judge the 
similarity of the words using a conceptual judgement criterion (i.e., function or 
use) tended to evaluate closer words as more similar and far-apart word pairs 
as less similar, while subjects which had to decide on perceptual similarity 
performed in the inverse direction (i.e., close as less similar and far as more 
similar). Casasanto’s study shows how, though linguistically, no difference is 
found between both types of similarity (we would use the same metaphor in 
the same way in both cases), there seems to be a difference in the mapping 
of similarity to distance depending on which dimension is to be evaluated. 
This can be taken as a very clear case in which empirical testing can not only 
enrich and refine the predictions by CMT but go beyond them, uncovering 
mechanisms which cannot be accessed using a purely linguistic methodology.
3.3. Other concrete-to-abstract metaphors
important is big. There is another group of metaphors which relate the 
physical domain of size with different abstract domains. This is what can be 
seen in the iMPOrtant is Big metaphor investigated by Schubert (in press) and 
Valenzuela & Soriano (2008). Valenzuela & Soriano (2008) reported on a 
series of experiments in which subjects had to decide which of two factors 
they judged as more important in their lifes. These “life factors” were abstract 
concepts and the answer to the task was a matter of personal choice (i.e., there 
was no “correct” answer). Thus, they would see “friendship” and “money” side 
by side, and they would have to choose one of these factors as more important 
for their lives. Size was manipulated by varying the font in which the words 
were presented; one of them was bigger (20 pt. font) and the other one smaller 
(12 pt. font). Their results showed that people were faster in their choice of 
the more important factor when the size was metaphor-coherent (i.e., big in 
size) than in the inverse case. Additionally, in another block, subjects were 
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asked to choose the less important factor for them. This time, if the iMPOrtant 
is Big metaphor was present, they should be quicker when choosing the smaller 
stimulus: roughly, an attempt to categorize a stimulus appearing in big font as 
“less important” should produce a inconsistency due to the automatic activation 
of “more important” associated to big stimuli, and accordingly subjects 
should take a longer time. Indeed such was the result, which can be taken 
a an indication that the metaphor iMPOrtant is Big is automatically activated 
in on-line tasks. In another experiment, Valenzuela and Soriano (2008) used 
the experimental paradigm known as Implicit Association Test (IAT) in which 
subjects have to create a novel-compound category made up of compatible or 
incompatible notions. In the case of the iMPOrtant is Big metaphor, subjects 
were much quicker and accurate when they had to group together “important” 
words along with “big” words (and “small” and “unimportant” words) than 
in the non-congruent cases (i.e., associating “important” and “small” words 
and “unimportant” and “big” words). Similar results, though still preliminary, 
have been reported by these authors applying this experimental paradigm to 
the affectiOn is warMth metaphor.
Schubert et alli (in press) has also investigated the relation between size 
and power (POwerful is Big), again showing the existence of flexibility in 
metaphorical mappings. In his experiments, subjects had to assign a social 
group to the category “powerful” or “powerless”. The words corresponding 
to the categories were presented either in big or small font. Their results 
showed that people’s responses were both quicker and more accurate when the 
stimulus font size matched the metaphor than in the inverse cases. However, 
when subjects were explained the possible effect of size and encouraged to 
try to avoid its influence, their error rate decreased; in a further experiment, 
not only were subjects informed of these possible effects, but they were also 
presented a high number of incongruent mappings (e.g., powerful group 
with small font), thus increasing their practice with these cases. In this last 
study, subjects reaction times also improved, showing again that the default 
application of metaphoric mappings can be subject to conscious control by part 
of conceptualizers, given a task that so requires it. 
4. cOnclusiOns
The goal of CmT is one of the most relevant for cognitive science: it 
is concerned with how we structure thought. As such, any advancement in 
the theory is vitally relevant for anyone interested in the study of cognition. 
Primary metaphor Theory has contributed to place CmT nearer to other current 
approaches to the study of embodied cognition, such as Embodiment theory 
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(e.g., Glenberg, 1997), Simulation Theories (e.g., Zwaan, 2004) or Perceptual 
Symbol Theory (e.g., barsalou 1999), to the extent that some of the results of 
these compatible theories could be taken as providing partial support for some 
of the views of CmT. At the very least, the basic idea that there are complex and 
abstract domains which are structured by the projection of information from 
more concrete domains (e.g., good and up/white/big8) does seem to receive 
support from many different studies from different areas. 
This is not to say that the CmT or even Primary metaphor Theory are 
without problems. For example, the origin and development course of primary 
metaphors (i.e., the Conflation hypothesis) has been insufficiently spelled out9; 
the interplay between universality and culture-specificity (e.g., Kovecses, 
2007) is in clear need of further clarification; even the psycholinguistic status 
of metaphors is not completely clear yet. Lakoff’s view of metaphors as 
stable, neurophysiologically implemented structures in the mind/brain has not 
received clear support from neuroscience, and proponents of cognition as a 
dynamical system10 would suggest alternative explanations for many of the 
phenomena observed. Finally, how do we choose between different versions 
of a metaphor (that is, the issue of flexibility) is again a point that will have to 
be clarified in the future. 
At the very least, the interplay between linguistically-based theoretical 
proposals on the one hand, and empirical work coming from other cognitive 
sciences, such as cognitive psychology, social psychology or neuroscience, 
on the other, seems to be working in this case. Thus, we have seen how 
empirical studies can suggest refinements in the theory (as was the case of 
the different time-lines existing in the tiMe is sPace metaphor), point at non-
linguistic realizations of metaphor (cf. left-right metaphors for time), or 
suggest restrictions or additions to proposed metaphors (cf Casasanto’s work 
on similarity as closeness). And if we take a look as the way in which other 
scientific disciplines work, it seems that, to use another spatial metaphor, this 
is the way to go.
8 For more information on these specific metaphors, see Meier & Robinson (2004), Meier, Robinson, 
Clore (2004) and meier, Robinson & Caven (in press), respectively. 
9 For a view explicitly challenging the Conflation hypothesis, see Seitz (2005).
10 For a review of these approaches, see Calvo-Garzón, Laakso & Gomila (2008); from the more 
“cognitive-linguistic” camp, Gibbs seems to be seduced by this dynamic-emergent approach (e.g., 
Gibbs & Cameron, 2008; Gibbs, 2008). 
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